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The crisis of certainty
An avalance of recent events has made us realize that the world in which 
we live is no t as safe as we have been used to believe. The image of m odern 
societies as societies which, arm ored with an absolute certainty guaranteed 
by scientific discourse, are in a position to control the totality of the real is 
suffering severe dislocations -  which does not necessarily mean, of course, 
that the hegem ony and the im portance of science in m odern culture is to­
tally underm ined. So, what is wrong? W hat happened to the unqualified 
optimism prom ising an unlim ited hum an domination on the totality of the 
real? Instead of this picture, what is now em erging is the surfacing of an 
elem ent which, up to now, had been repressed from our perception o f re­
ality, a perception which was previously thought to be objective and is now 
suddenly revealed to be the result of a contingent process of social construc­
tion. W hat can this elem ent be? The most plausible answer seems to be the 
following: it is the elem ent o f uncertainty which now returns to haunt our 
certainties; it is an elem ent of negativity which returns to dislocate our con­
structions of social positivity. In other words, what was thought to be impos­
sible is happening in front our very eyes. In Lacanian terms, we seem to be 
encountering the real in a way which is perhaps unprecedented. Consider, 
for example, the ‘m ad cow disease’ issue. What is revealed now is that the 
certainties which supported our way of life, which made our way of life pos­
sible - a n  integral part of that way of life was the consumption of m eat-w ere 
no t privileged and undeniable truths -  as almost everyone was led to believe
-  bu t social constructions with limited duration and validity. In today’s risk 
society -  here Ulrich Beck’s work is of prime importance -  every certainty is 
increasingly being revealed as a social construction which can never neutral­
ize and dom esticate the real -  with all its Lacanian connotations.
But what exactly do we m ean when we say that the certainties support­
ing our way of life are nothing but social constructions? Obviously, the no-
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tion of construction does no t entail any accusations o f conscious deception. 
W hat it implies is something deeper and constitutive: hum ans cannot live 
their lives and develop a knowledge regarding their environm ent, natural 
and social, without representing it, w ithout constructing it a t the symbolic 
and the imaginary level; without attributing to it logical coherence and pre­
dictability. This ‘logical’ veil which covers over the heterogeneous dom ains 
of the real is a phenom enon so massive and systematic that it is impossible 
to conceive it as a conscious deception (Pecheux 1988: 638). In o ther words, 
humans are, in a certain sense, ‘obliged’ to construct their reality due to their 
constitutive inability of knowing and m astering the real, due to their attach­
m ent to language -  humans inhabit language and are inhabited by language 
and thus have to approach the real indirectly and never in a definitive way.
The problem here is that in spite o f this hum an deficiency -  or rather 
because of it — all hum an action has to be supported  by an illusory social 
construction purporting to master the impossible real -  what is illusory, of 
course, is not that this is a social construction but the fact that it promises 
an absolute mastery of the real. Let me briefly clarify this statem ent. No 
doubt, hum ans are required to ‘act’ and indeed ‘act’ all the time, transform ­
ing their hum an and non-human environm ent, in o rder to follow the path 
of their desires and develop their civilization. All these actions presuppose 
some kind of a priori safety net, a ne t offered by the field o f social construc­
tion (scientific assumptions, political calculations and institutions, person­
al plans, insurance policies, the welfare state etc.). W hat is usually neglect­
ed, however, is the relative and transitory character of all these constructions 
and of the safety they can provide. We dem and from  science and from our 
political system complete safety and this is som ething we are usually prom ­
ised. What we are not offered is the knowledge -  this would be a savoir and 
not a connaissance- that this supposed safety, even when it is consistent with 
the results of scientific research in a particular field, is never om nipotent, 
since science, as all discursive constructions, is no t guaranteed a privileged 
direct access to the deep essence o f things. This was clearly the dom inant 
m odern view, a  view which accepted that scientists -  especially natural sci­
entists -  where in a privileged position to arrive at safe, ‘objective’ descrip­
tions of nature -  of the deep ‘essence’ o f nature -  and thus to eliminate any 
uncertainty and risk entailed in hum an action. Contem porary epistemolo­
gy and history of science clearly underm ine these assumptions. In o ther 
words, what is emerging today is the dislocation of scientific objectivism and 
essentialism. Certainty is not the same as it was.
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Certainty and modernity: a constitutive tension ?
But surely this is not something new within our m odern context. In fact, 
m odernity is primarily associated with the dislocation of certainty, of the 
certainties characterizing pre-m odern societies. With modernity, the unex­
pected and doubt -  elem ents which were foreclosed by traditional forms of 
reason -  resurface in the horizon and are inscribed, perhaps for the first time 
with such force, in scientific and philosophical discourse and political im­
agination. Descartes’ example is revealing since his whole enterprise is based 
on the recognition of the constitutive nature of doubt. But this position is 
no t elim inating the traum atic character of uncertainty. It was understanda­
ble for people who were used to seek the support for their way of life in 
absolute certainties to continue to need them within the m odern universe 
of m eaning. This is why m odern science ‘reoccupied’ the field of pre-mod- 
ern certainties. O ne should not forget that even in Descartes’s argum ent the 
constitutivity o f doubt is acknowledged only to be eliminated, in a second 
move, by the emergence of absolute certainty. Thus, the recognition of doubt 
causes new anti-modern outbreaks that attempt to eliminate doubt anew and 
create new certainties that would put an end to the continuous questioning 
m odernity entails in its critical dimension (Beck 1996a: 183).
Simply put, although m odern science is founded on the critique of pre­
m odern certainties, of ‘objective’ reason in H orkheim er’s vocabulary, it did 
no t m anage to ‘abandon the idea of a harmony between thought and the 
world, but just replaced the medieval idea that this harmony was preordained 
with the notion that thought and world could be brought into harmony with 
the use o f a »neutral« and »objective« scientific discourse’. The aim is, in 
both cases, to elim inate the distance between the real -  what is impossible 
to represent -  and reality -  the field of imaginary and symbolic representa­
tion; to articulate privileged representations of the world with a universal 
validity independen t of any social, cultural or discursive context (Szerszyn- 
ski 1996: 107-108). Thus, m odernity identified itself with the emergence of 
new absolute certainties in the place of the dislocated pre-modern ones. The 
problem  here is that seeking final and objective answers and failing to rec­
ognize that every answer of this kind is finite, articulated within a particular 
historical and social context, signals a return to the pre-modern world (Doug­
las and Wildavsky 1982: 30). Negating its own founding moment, the mo­
m ent o f doubt and critique, Enlightenment, becomes trapped in the pre­
m odern urge to m aster the totality of the real, to reach absolute certainty. 
This is the project o f a royal science:
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The project of a knowledge that would unify this multiplicity o f »things 
to be known« into a hom ogeneous representable structure, the idea o f a 
possible science of the structure of the real, capable of making it explicit, ou t­
side of any false semblance, and o f assuring the control over this real with­
out the risks of interpretation (therefore a scientific self-reading of the real, 
without faults or lack) -  this project obviously corresponds to an urgency 
so vivid, so universally »human«, tied (knotted) so well (around the same 
stake of dom ination/resistance) to the interests of successive masters of this 
world, as well as to those of the wretched of the earth, that the phantasm  of 
such an effective, manageable, and transmissible knowledge could no t fail 
historically to use any means to make itself materialize.
The promise of a royal science as conceptually rigorous as m athem at­
ics, as concretely effective as material technologies, as om nipresent as phi­
losophy and politics -  how could hum anity resist such a godsend? (Pecheux 
1988: 640)
As Jacques Lacan has put it, through this fantasy m odern society returns 
to a state o f myth: ‘How is one to return , if no t on the basis o f a peculiar 
(special) discourse, to a prediscursive reality? T hat is the dream  -  the dream  
behind every conception (idea) of knowledge. But it is also what must be 
considered mythical. T here’s no such thing as a prediscursive reality. Every 
reality is founded and defined by a discourse’ (Lacan 1998: 32).
The legitimacy of modernity
Given this whole context, m odernity is revealed as a deeply ambiguous 
project. This ambiguity of modernity is directly related to the question of 
the so-called legitimacy of modernity. O ur reference to the concept o f re­
occupation in the previous section of this text could serve as an in troduc­
tion to this problematic. The basic issue here is reflected in the following 
question, ‘Is modernity enough m odern?’ K. Lowith, in his seminal Mean­
ing in History, written in 1949, presents an argum ent according to which 
modernity and the m odern conception o f history have inherited  many of 
their features from  Christian eschatology. For Lowith, for exam ple, the 
m odern conception of time and temporality is clearly Christian: ‘even the 
articulation of all historical time into past, present and future reflects the 
temporal structure of the history of salvation. It is only because of our habit 
of thinking in terms of the Christian tradition that the formal division o f all 
historical time into past, present and future times seems so entirely natural 
and self-evident’ (Lowith 1949: 185). Besides this conception o f tem porali­
182
ty, the whole conception of history, the revelatory character of m odern his­
torical and em ancipatory narratives, the ultimate goal o f a reconciled soci­
ety and the idea o f progress itself are derived from Christian eschatology. 
O ne could continue this line o f argum entation ad infinitum. In fact isn’t the 
scholastic veritas est adequatio rei et intellectus the first symptom of m odern 
representationalism  and o f the m odern claim for a total representability of 
the world? (Yannaras 1988:129). The m odern world is in fact irreligious, but 
on the o ther hand, depends on Christianity from which it is emancipated 
(Lowith 1949: 201). However, one must not think that modernity is ju st a 
m ere consequence of Christianity. The secularization thesis elaborated by 
Lowith does not imply that. What Lowith argues is that m odern historical 
consciousness is Christian by derivation and not by consequence.
At the seventh German philosophy congress in 1962, Hans Blumem- 
berg criticized Lowith’s secularization category. Furtherm ore, in his book 
The Legitimacy of the Modern Age, he elaborated a new theory on how Christi­
anity influenced the em ergence of modernity (Blumenberg 1986). Trying 
to prove unintelligible the secularization thesis, he argues that the continu­
ity characterizing Christianity and modernity is not a continuity of solutions, 
bu t a continuity of problem s or questions. We are not faced with the trans­
form ation of som ething that was originally Christian but with a reoccupation, 
a process that is present in every historical age. In our case a reoccupation 
occurs when m odern historical forms are led to answer questions belong­
ing to a pre-m odern period instead of abandoning them  altogether. The 
English translator of Blum em berg’s book argues in relation to this particu­
lar point:
Christianity, he (Blumenberg) says, through its claim to be able to ac­
count for the overall pattern of world history in terms of the poles of crea­
tion and eschatology, had put in place a new question, one that had been 
(as Lowith so forcefully insists) unknown to the Greeks: the question of the 
m eaning and pattern  o f world history as a whole. When m odern thinkers 
abandoned the Christian »answers« they still felt an obligation to answer the 
questions that went with them  -  to show that m odern thought was equal to 
any challenge, as it were. It was this compulsion to »reoccupy« the »position« 
of the medieval Christian schem a of creation and eschatology -  rather than 
leave it empty, as a rationality that was aware of its own limits might have done
-  tha t led to the grandiose constructions o f the philosophy of history. 
(Blumemberg 1986: xx-xxi)
As Ernesto Laclau has pointed out, modernity should be viewed as a 
result o f the conflation of the notions of reason -  an Ancient Greek con­
cept -  and the Christian notion of an eschatological representation of the
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totality of the real (Laclau 1991: 56). Thus history and society are referred  
to a single ground of hum an rationality. This strategy however is no t unprob­
lematic. The problem  is that m odernity denotes a dem and ‘for external 
guarantee [a ‘reoccupation’ of a Christian ground for Blum enberg or a ‘re- 
appropriation’ in Vattimo’s vocabulary] inside a culture that has erased the 
ontological preconditions for them ’ (Connolly 1988:11). As m entioned  
above, the result o f this play can only be an irreducible tension.
The political ontology of social construction
Today that these m odern reoccupations are being slowly dislocated, 
certainty is reduced to a hum an construction. The main point here is the 
following: if, in the past, it was thought possible to acquire an objective rep­
resentation or symbolization of reality, even o f the deep essence o f things, 
constructionism argues that the failure o f all these attem pts, o f all these 
reoccupations, the historical and social relativity of hum an representations 
of reality, show that this reality is always the result o f a process o f social con­
struction. W hat we accept as (objective) reality is nothing bu t a social con­
struction with limited duration. Reality is always constructed at the level of 
meaning and discourse. Lacan, for example, although he is no t the paradig­
matic case of a constructionist theorist, suggests that social reality is no t a 
stable referent, a depository of identity, but a semblance created by the play 
of symbolization and fantasmatic coherence. Reality is lacking and, at the 
same time, attempting to hide this lack through the symbolic and imaginary 
means a t its disposal -  this is, in fact, the aim of all m odern reoccupations.
Although Lacan is not a traditional constructionist -  and we will see why 
in a minute -  his argum ent includes certain constructionist assumptions. For 
Lacan, reality is always discursively constructed. In his unpublished sem inar 
on the Crucial Problems for Psychoanalysis, he points ou t that any reference to 
reality, to reality as an objective whole, should generate a certain mistrust 
(seminar of 24 February 1965); elsewhere he refers to the myth o f reality. 
And, in Encore, he concludes: ‘There isn’t the slightest prediscursive reality, 
for the very fine reason that what constitutes a collectivity-what I called men, 
women, and children -  means nothing qua prediscursive reality. Men, wom­
en, and children are butsignifiers’ (Lacan 1998: 33). Existence depends on 
linguistic representation; what cannot be articulated in language, strictly 
speaking, does not exist. In short, reality ‘is upheld, woven through, consti­
tuted, by a tress of signifiers’; reality, in o ther words, ‘implies the subject’s
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integration into a particular play of signifiers’ (Lacan 1993: 249). It is the 
signifier that produces reality:
Day and night, man and woman, peace and war -  I could enum erate 
more oppositions that d o n ’t emerge out of the real world but give it its frame­
work, its axes, its structure, that organize it, that bring it about that there is 
in effect a reality for man, and that he can find his bearings therein. The 
notion o f reality that we bring to bear in analysis presupposes this web, this 
mesh of signifiers. (Lacan 1993: 199)
Furtherm ore, this whole symbolic production of reality is always sup­
ported  by a whole fantasy construction. The construction o f reality, the illu­
sion o f the world as a well-structured whole, would not be possible without 
the intervention of this elem ent of fantasy. In Lacan’s view, ‘everything we 
are allowed to approach by way of reality remains rooted in fantasy’ (Lacan 
1998: 95). As Jacques-Alain Miller has put it with a touch of exaggeration, 
‘reality is fantasy’ (Miller 1995: 12).
Lacan’s position, however, cannot be reduced to the standard argumen­
tation o f social constructionism . While standard constructionism remains 
trapped within the level of construction -  since it does not take into account 
anything beyond this level -  Lacan, on the contrary, centers the last part of 
his teaching around the concept of the real, of what is impossible to con­
struct, of what escapes representation at the imaginary and the symbolic 
level. From  a Lacanian po in t o f view construction can make sense only 
against a background of real impossibility.
The field of social construction is the field in which the symbolization 
of this real is attem pted. Chaitin is correct when asserting that ‘symboliza­
tion has the creative power to produce cultural identities, but at a price, the 
cost o f covering over the fundam ental nothingness that forms its founda­
tion ... it is culture, no t nature, that abhors a vacuum, above all that of its 
own contingency’ (Chaitin 1996: 4-5), of its ultimate inability to master the 
real, of the irreducible impossibility of symbolizing this real: ‘there is a struc­
tural lack in the symbolic, which means that certain points of the real can’t 
be symbolized in a definite manner. ... the unmitigated real provokes anxi­
ety, and this in tu rn  gives rise to never-ending, defensive, imaginary con­
structs’ (Verhaeghe 1994: 60). Simply put, ‘all human productions [‘Socie­
ty itself, culture, religion, science’] ... can be understood in the light of that 
structural failure o f the symbolic in relationship to the real’ (Verhaeghe 1994: 
61).
W hat is most im portant, however, is that the problematic of the real 
introduces a certain political elem ent to our discussion. When the exclud­
ed real resurfaces within the field of our constructions these constructions
Beyond the Certainty Principle: Towards a Political Reading...
185
Yannis Stavrakakis
can enter into a period of crisis revealing their ultimate political g round­
ing; what is realized is that they were no t privileged representations o f the 
real but sedim ented forms o f a political institution. Every dislocation, every 
encounter with the real, signals the resurfacing of the political since dislo­
cation can only be (partially) symbolized through a decision taken within 
the context of a hegemonic play. As soon as this decision is taken, as soon 
as we have a new (temporary) symbolization which hegemonizes the social, 
the political is again forgotten. In o ther words, social construction, the im­
aginary and symbolic sedim entation of the social, presupposes a certain  
repression of the constitutivity of the political. It entails an impossible at­
tem pt to erase the political ontology of the social. W hen we limit our scope 
within socially constructed reality we are attempting a certain dom estication/ 
spatialization of the political, we move our attention from the political per 
se (as the m om ent of the disruption and the undecidability governing the 
reconstruction of social objectivity and certainty) to the social (as the locus 
of this construction itself, of the sedim ented forms of objectivity and certain­
ty) (Laclau 1990: 35). This sedim entation of social reality requires a forget­
ting of origins, of the contingent force of dislocation which stands at its foun­
dation; it requires the symbolic and fantasmatic reduction of the political 
as an encounter with the real. Let me further illustrate this point in relation 
to the particular status of modernity by returning to the Cartesian argum ent.
Descartes and the political
As I have pointed out earlier, it is doubt that, in Descartes’ conception, 
functions as the point of departure in o rder to reach absolute and certain 
knowledge. In doubt Descartes founds the absolute certainty o f existence. 
Let me briefly dem onstrate how this certainty is produced. The first point 
of his argum ent is the affirmation o f the uncertainty of the world. For Des­
cartes supposes that our sense and our memory, in fact our own m ind o r a 
superficial deceiver are indeed deceiving us. ‘W hat then shall be considered 
true? Perhaps only this, that there is nothing certain in the world’ (Descartes 
1968: 102). However, he does not stop here, as the sceptics and M ontaigne 
did earlier (Sutclife in Descartes 1968: 18). He is going to transform  this 
problem  into the only basis for his argum ent. We know, by now, that we can 
doubt everything. But then we have to accept that we cannot doubt the fact 
that we can doubt. Thus, we now positively know that we can doubt. As a 
result, if doubt is an intellectual function, an act o f thought, then we know 
positively that we are thinking. However, in o rder to be able to think, one
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has first to exist. H ence, if I think therefore I am, I exist: ‘I am, I exist, is 
necessarily true, every time I express it or conceive it in my m ind’ (Descartes 
1968: 103).
In Descartes’ argum ent we can easily distinguish two distinct moments: 
the m om ent of doubt and that of certainty. These two moments do not ex­
ist separately as the supposedly dual nature of the hum an world. On the 
contrary, the first m om ent, that of doubt and uncertainty, is affirmed only 
to be used as a foundation in order to elaborate its own negation, that is to 
say, absolute truth, objectivity and transparency; in order to found certain­
ty. In this sense, the m om ent of doubt is considered as an object of thought 
only to be forgotten later, elim inated as it is by its own consequence. What 
is o f prim e interest here is that this mastery of the uncertainty o f our world 
by absolute tru th  (individual thought) is not merely a m atter of academic 
philosophical interest. I shall try to show that it is rather a political issue and 
thus I will try to articulate a certain political reading o f Descartes which is 
directly relevant for our discussion up to now.
In fact, Descartes him self admits that his problem is not doubt itself. 
The problem  is that we have to make decisions without being certain of their 
outcom e and success — which links the Cartesian argum ent to the problem ­
atic developed in the opening statements of this text. In o ther words, there 
is a gap between ‘the power’ we ‘have of knowing things’ and the power of 
choice, or free will, that is to say between our ‘understanding’ and our ‘will’ 
(Descartes 1968:135). Man is free and freedom means that it is possible for 
him to misjudge, to make mistakes; it means that he is exposed to certain 
deficiencies. Descartes cannot stand this open, contingent, undecidable, 
deeply uncertain and political character of hum an action. He wants to elim­
inate it. He attem pts to m aster the political (as an encounter with the real, 
as opening a non-algorithmic field o f decision) by basing decision on a cer­
tain, undoubtful, absolute knowledge (although this move empties decision 
from every possible m eaning in terms of human will). For Descartes, human 
will is m ore extensive than hum an understanding, but in order not to mis­
use free will, the knowledge of understanding must always precede the de­
term ination of the will (Descartes 1968:139). This royal knowledge of un­
derstanding is now possible due to his own argument: ‘I have not only learnt 
today what I m ust avoid in order to escape error, but also what I must do in 
order to arrive at knowledge o f the tru th ’ (Descartes 1968:141).
To sum up, what is revealed in our reading of Descartes is the strategy 
through which scepticism -  a reaction to the first signs of the ‘Death o f God’ 
and the dislocation o f traditional systems of meaning -  gives its place to 
certainty; to the creation of a new foundation through rational methods. This
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is what one could call the ideotypical m odern strategy of reoccupation. Here 
the traces o f the contingency of the em erging certainty are always blurred. 
The m odern drama, however, is that these traces are persistently re-emerg­
ing, leading modernity to various crises and to a fu rther proliferation o f 
defensive rationalist strategies up to Haberm asian rationalism. This is evi­
dent even in Descartes’ own writings. Ironically the tragical and ambiguous 
nature o f our brave new world, the constitutive lack around which it is al­
ways structured, is depicted in the last sentence of Descartes’ Meditations 
where the most grandiose attempt towards total certainty seems to refute and 
contradict itself, in the following way:
But because the necessities of action often oblige us to make a decision 
before we have had the leisure to exam ine things so carefully, it m ust be 
adm itted that the life of man is very often subject to error, in particular cas­
es; and we must, in conclusion, recognize the infirmity and weakness o f our 
nature. (Descartes 1968: 168-169)
This is the place from which a political deconstruction of the Cartesian 
argum ent could start, the place where the political dislocates certainty and 
construction is revealed as the limit of hum an knowledge.
Creating a political modernity
It seems that today we are moving closer to this last Cartesian statem ent 
than to the m odern reoccupations of pre-m odern certainties. Today’s soci­
eties are faced with the return of uncertainty, with the resurfacing o f the 
inability to master the real (Beck 1996a: 84). We are forced, so to speak, to 
acknowledge the ambiguity of our experience and to approach self-critical- 
ly our abilities vis a vis controlling the real (Beck 1996a: 88). From a past. 
characterized by the quest for scientific, ethical and social certainties we turn 
to a present where the possibility of reaching certainty itself is questioned. 
We might be witnessing the end of a type o f rationality which is now proven 
untenable for our societies (Gulbenkian commission 1998: 61), the end of 
reoccupation in our vocabulary.
This creates the chance to return  to the founding m om ent o f m oder­
nity or to reconstruct it anew. Such a move entails recognizing the irreduc­
ible character o f impossibility, the constitutivity of the real as expressed pri­
marily in the failure of our discursive world and its continuous rearticula­
tion through acts of identification (this is the form decision takes). It pre­
supposes a reorientation of science and knowledge. Recognizing the con­
stitutivity of the real does not mean that we stop symbolizing; it m eans that
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we start trying to incorporate this recognition within the symbolic itself, in 
fact it means that since the symbolic entails lack as such we abstain from 
covering it over with fantasmatic constructs. The guiding principle in this 
kind o f approach is to move beyond the fantasy of certainty towards a self- 
critical symbolic gesture acknowledging the contingent and transient char­
acter of every symbolic construct, acknowledging the political ontology of 
the social.
This can be the basis for a scientific discourse different from the rei­
fied science o f standard modernity. In his text ‘Science and Truth’ (it is the 
opening lecture of his 1965-66 seminar on The Object of Psychoanalysis) Jacques 
Lacan stages a critique of m odern science as it has been articulated up to 
now, that is to say as a discourse that identifies the knowledge it produces 
with the tru th  o f the real. If the constitutive, non-reducible character of the 
real introduces a lack into hum an reality, to our scientific constructions of 
reality for example, science usually attempts to suture and eliminate this gap. 
Lacan, for his part, stresses the importance of that which puts in danger this 
self-fulfilling nature of scientific axioms: the im portance of the real, of the 
elem ent which is no t developing according to what we think about it. In that 
sense, Lacan’s science entails the recognition of the structural causality of 
the real as the elem ent which interrupts the smooth flow of our fantasmat­
ic and symbolic representations of reality. Within such a context, this real, 
the obstacle encountered by standard science, is not bypassed discretely but 
introduced within the theory which it can destabilize. Truth, as the encounter 
with the real, is ‘encoun tered ’ face to face (Fink 1995: 140-141). It is in this 
sense that psychoanalysis can be described as a science of the impossible, a 
science that does not foreclose or repress the impossible real. For Lacan, 
what is involved in the structuration of the discourse of science is a certain 
Verwerfung o f the Thing which is presupposed by the ideal of absolute knowl­
edge, an ideal which ‘as everybody knows ... was historically proved in the 
end to be a failure’ (Lacan 1992: 131). In other words, we cannot be cer­
tain that definite knowledge is attainable. In fact, for Lacan, certainty is not 
som ething we should attribute to our knowledge of things. Certainty is a 
defining characteristic of psychosis. For Lacan, it constitutes its elementary 
phenom enon, the basis of delusional belief (Lacan 1993: 75).
Given this context, opening up our symbolic resources to uncertainty 
seems to be the only p ruden t move we have left. What we can know has to 
be expressed within the structure of language but this structure has to in­
corporate a recognition of its own limits. This is not a development which 
should cause unease; as Nancy has put it ‘What will become of our world is 
som ething we cannot know, and we can no longer believe in being able to
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predict or command it. But we can act in such a way that this world is a world 
able to open itself up to its own uncertainty as such ... Invention is always 
without a model and without warranty. But indeed that implies facing up to 
turmoil, anxiety, even disarray. W here certainties come apart, there  too 
gathers the strength that no certainty can m atch’ (Nancy in Lacoue-Labar- 
the and Nancy 1997: 157-158).
These brief remarks on science and knowledge initiate a whole new 
understanding and structuration of the social. W hat could be some of the 
parameters of this new organization o f the social in our late m odern terrain? 
Beck’s theory seems to be relevant in this respect. According to our reading 
of Beck’s schem a, contem porary  societies are faced with the re tu rn  o f 
uncertainty, a return  of the repressed without doubt, and the increasing 
inability of mastering the totality of the real. We are forced thus to recognize 
the ambiguity of our experience and to articulate a self-critical position 
towards ou r ability to m aster the real. It is now revealed tha t a lthough 
repressing doubt and uncertainty can provide tem porary safety of meaning, 
it is nevertheless a dangerous strategy, a stra tegy  th a t d e p e n d s  on  a 
fantasmatic illusion. This realization, contrary to any nihilistic reaction, can 
become the starting point for a new form  of society which is em erging 
around us, together of course with the reactionary attempts to reinstate an 
aging m odern ity : ‘P erhaps the d ec lin e  o f  th e  lo d es ta rs  o f  p rim ary  
Enlightenment, the individual, identity, truth, reality, science, technology, 
and so on, is the prerequisite for the start of an alternative Enlightenm ent, 
one which does not fear doubt, but instead makes it the elem ent o f its life 
and survival’ (Beck 1997a: 161). Beck argues that such an openness towards 
doubt can be learnt from  Socrates, M ontaigne, and others; it m ight be 
possible to add Lacan to this list.
Within this context, doubt, which threatens our false-certainties, can 
become the nodal point for another m odernity that will respect the right 
to err: scepticism ‘contrary to a widespread error, makes everything possible 
again: questions and dialogue of course, as well as faith, science, knowledge, 
criticism, morality, society, only differently  ... th ings unsuspected  and 
incongruous, with the tolerance based and rooted in the ultimate certainty 
of error’ (Beck 1997a: 163). Doubts liberate; they make things possible. First 
of all the possibility of a new vision for society. An anti-utopian vision founded 
on the principle ‘Dubio ergo sum ’ (Beck 1997a: 162) m ore close to the 
subversive doubtfulness of Montaigne than to the deceptive scepticism of 
Descartes. Although Lacan thought that in M ontaigne scepticism had no t 
acquired the form of an ethic, he nevertheless pointed out that ‘M ontaigne 
is truly the one who has centered himself, no t around scepticism but around
190
Beyond the Certainty Principle: Towards a Political Reading...
the living m om ent of the aphanisis of the subject. And it is in this that he is 
fruitful, that he is an e ternal guide, who goes beyond whatever may be 
represen ted  o f the m om ent to be defined as a historical turning-point’ 
(Lacan 1998: 223-4).
This is a standpoint which is both critical and self-critical: there is no 
foundation ‘of such a scope and elasticity for a critical theory of society (which 
would then automatically be a self-critical) as doubt’ (Beck 1996:173). Doubt, 
the invigorating champagne of thinking, points to a new modernity ‘more 
m odern than the old, industrial modernity that we know, The latter after all, 
is based on certainty, on repelling and suppressing doubt’ (Beck 1997a: 173). 
Beck asks us to fight for ‘a modernity which is beginning to doubt itself, which, 
if things go well, will make doubt the measure and architect of its self-limita­
tion and self-modification’ (Beck 1997a: 163). He asks us, to use Celan’s phrase 
to ‘build on inconsistencies’. This will be a modernity instituting a new poli­
tics, a politics recognizing the uncertainty of the moment of the political. It 
will be a modernity recognizing the constitutivity of the real in the social. A 
truly political modernity (Beck 1997a: 5).
In fact, the elim ination of uncertainty from our life on top of being 
impossible, is also undesirable. Only when there is uncertainty there is room 
for responsibility and ethics. W ithout uncertainty, in a totally certain world, 
hum ans would be reduced to predeterm ined automata. A world without 
uncertainty would be a world without freedom. Thus we are led again to the 
political dim ension of our discussion. Uncertainty is not only an ethical but 
also a deeply political issue. The only thing that still remains certain is that 
we will continue to take decisions within an undecidable terrain, within a 
terrain o f uncertainty; no support for these decisions can be found in con­
structing fantasmatic symbolizations/reoccupations of certainty. Once this 
is granted what is also opened  is the question of the legitimization of these 
decisions. The fact that they can no longer be legitimized by recourse to an 
illusory certainty guaranteed by a supposed direct access to the real offers 
the opportunity to enhance the potential of m odern democracy. The trust 
in the decision m aking process can only depend on the open character of 
this process.
This is then our closing statement: the revelation of the constructed 
character of every certainty, the recognition of the constitutive character of 
uncertainty in hum an experience, makes necessary the open political ad­
m inistration o f this uncertainty, an administration through democratic pro­
cedures. W hat is thus em erging is the profile of a society which discusses the 
consequences o f its decisions before these are taken by someone else (an 
‘om nipo ten t’ scientist, technocrat or politician). In this form of civil socie­
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ty decisions which were previously taken behind  closed doors, through sup­
posedly de-politicized ‘objective’ procedures, are politicized again (Grove- 
White 1997: 119). Since none can m aster a certainty perm itting him to de­
cide in a totally safe way on our behalf, it becomes m ore p ruden t to decide 
democratically. Although this way it seems as if are assuming a h igher risk, 
this is only an illusion: the risk is no t different. The only difference is that it 
is assumed by all of us instead of being adm inistered by ‘som eone else’ (a 
supposedly full O ther): we are all called to accept the responsibility for the 
political nature of hum an culture. In that sense, recognizing uncertainty 
becomes one of the most im portant dem ocratic challenges of ou r age, a 
difficult task but a task that has to be assumed urgently.
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